Recent pollinator population declines threaten pollination services and greatly impact plantpollinator coevolution. In the present article, we investigate how such evolutionary effects affect plant-pollinator coexistence. Using eco-evolutionary dynamics, we study the evolution of plant attractiveness in a simple pollinator-plant model, assuming an allocation trade-off between attractiveness (e.g. nectar production, flower shape and size) and plant intrinsic growth rates. First, we investigated how attractiveness evolution changes species persistence, biomass production, and the intensity of the mutualism (as a proxy for pollination services).
Several theoretical studies have investigated the ecological [14] [15] [16] [17] and evolutionary dynamics [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] of plant-pollinated communities. In particular, evolution of selfing with changing communities has been studied in several papers [23] [24] [25] . However, so far no study has investigated the consequence of declining pollinator populations on the eco-evolutionary process within a plant-pollinator community with evolving plant attractiveness. Here, we study this question in a system made of one plant species and one pollinator species. We investigate the evolution of plant attractiveness using an adaptive dynamics framework. This framework explicitly accounts for the eco-evolutionary feedback loop between the plant and the pollinator species. Using this model, we clarify when the plant species evolves to high or low attractiveness and determine the conditions under which evolution leads to coexistence of the whole system. We then show that a declining pollinator population often results in a counterselection of plant attractiveness, eventually enhancing pollinator declines.
Plant-pollinator model and ecological dynamics
We consider a simple system with two interacting species; a plant with population density P , and a pollinator with population density A . The community dynamics are given by a Lotka-Volterra type model:
A schematic view of the system is given in figure 1 . The parameters r A and r P correspond to the intrinsic growth rate of the pollinator and plant species, respectively. We assume r P to be strictly positive because of other reproduction means, e.g. vegetative reproduction or 3 30 35 autogamy. The intrinsic growth rate of the pollinator ( r A ) can be positive (e.g., interaction with other plants) or negative. Parameters c A and c P modulates intraspecific competition for the two species. Mutualistic interactions are given by α γ A and α γ P , with γ P the energetic gain provided by the plant (via nectar, pollen and/or other plant exudates) to the pollinator, and γ A the fertilisation provided by the pollinator to the plant. Parameter α represents the plant attractiveness, largely defined and corresponds to the trait that will be under selection in the rest of the study. This attractiveness includes investment in various characters such as the number of flowers, their shape, their colour, volatile organic compound (VOCs) that attract insects with their odor, plant height, flowering duration (see part II in Willmer (2011) [26] ).
Figure 1: Population variation rates of plant P and pollinator A .
Blue arrows indicate the density variations independent of the mutualistic interaction, green arrows the effects of the mutualistic interaction, and red arrows the effects of intraspecific competition. The parameters are described in the main text.
The ecological dynamics of equivalent models were studied by Goh (1979) [14] . 
The first two inequalities give the condition for the existence of an equilibrium point allowing positive densities (feasibility conditions). The last inequality ensures the dynamical stability of the equilibrium. In the case of two interacting species, this local stability condition implies the global stability of the feasible equilibrium. The globally stable equilibrium is then:
If the stability condition is not fulfilled, i.e., interspecific mutualism is stronger than intraspecific competition, the positive feedback loop resulting from interspecific mutualism may drive the system towards infinite growth. In such cases, other limiting factors (e.g. pathogen, predators, or new competitors) eventually regulate the populations. Since these factors are not taken into account in our model assumptions, we define a maximum plant attractiveness α cl below which stability is warranted:
We allow the evolution of α between zero (no investment in attractiveness) and this maximal level α m a x <α cl .
Evolution of plant attractiveness
We study the evolution of plant attractiveness ( α ), assuming an allocation trade-off affecting r P [27] . The plant has a given quantity of energy, divided into different functions; some energy is allocated to intrinsic growth and to self-reproduction, and some to attractiveness [27, 28] . We consider different trade-off shapes; linear, concave or convex. The shape of the trade-off is controlled by the parameter s ( s >1 concave; s=1 linear; s <1 convex). Detailed mathematical formulations of the trade-off functions are given in the supplementary material.
We follow the evolution of plant attractiveness using adaptive dynamics. This method models explicitly the evolutionary consequences on species density dynamics, and the feedback of species density on the evolutionary process [29, 30] . Evolution occurs via small mutations steps between which densities reach the ecological equilibrium. It also assumes clonal reproduction and small phenotypic impact of the mutations. The differential equation describing the evolution of the phenotypic traits, known as the canonical equation [29] , is given by:
The term 1 2 μ σ 2 P * (α ) encapsulates the phenotypic variability brought by the mutation process on which selection can act; with μ the per individual mutation rate, σ 2 the variance of the mutation phenotypic effect, and P * (α ) the plant equilibrium density. The last term is called the selective gradient. It embodies the effects of natural selection, based on the variations of the relative fitness of mutants α m given a resident population of attractiveness α . Therefore, the sign of the selective gradient gives the direction of evolution; a positive gradient selects larger attractiveness, while a negative gradient selects smaller trait values.
The relative fitness of a mutant at a very low density is explicitly derived from the ecological dynamics (equation (1)). It is computed as the per capita growth rate of a rare mutant population in a resident population at ecological equilibrium (3):
with P * (α ) and A * ( α ) given by equation 3. Remember that, due to the allocation costs, the plant intrinsic growth rate varies with the level of attractiveness r P ( α ) .
Eco-evolutionary dynamic (equation 5) may exhibit equilibrium points, called evolutionary singular strategies. They correspond to trait values at which the adaptive dynamic (5) is at equilibrium, i.e., the time derivative is equal to zeros. Since all terms apart the selective gradient are always positive, the singular strategies occur when the selective gradient is null.
This corresponds to values α satisfying:
At singularities, costs in terms of energy dedicated to alternative means of reproduction ( d r P (α)/dα ) therefore match pollination benefits ( γ A A * (α) ). The existence of a singular strategy is not enough to guarantee that evolutionary dynamics locally lead to it (convergence condition) or that it persists (non-invasibility condition, i.e. resistance to invasion by nearby mutants). A singular strategy that is both convergent and non-invasible is called a continuously stable strategy (CSS) [31] . To have long-term coexistence, the evolutionary process needs to converge to a CSS at which we have ecological coexistence of the plant and the pollinator. Three other types of singular strategies can arise from the evolutionary process: Garden of Eden (non-convergent and non-invasible), repellor (non-convergent and invasible), and branching points (convergent and invasible). Calculation of the second and cross-derivative of the fitness function determines criteria for convergence and invasibility [32] . The mathematical computation for the existence of singular strategies and their convergence and invasibility properties are given in the supplementary material. Equation (7) can be solved analytically for particular set of parameters (see supplementary material). For other cases, we graphically determine the values and the convergence and invasibility properties of the singular strategies using the pairwise invasibility plots (figure 2). and 2d). While analytical calculation was intractable for the convergence condition, except with the linear case for which we always obtain a divergent singular strategy, we could explore the model using sensitivity analysis and the PIPs. For positive pollinator intrinsic growth rate, we obtain only one convergent stable singular strategies (CSS) at which the ecological coexistence is granted. In that case, long-term coexistence is obtained. For negative pollinator intrinsic growth rate, the system exhibits a second singular strategy that is a Garden of Eden. In the following, we will study only concave trade-off function (i.e. s >1 ). 
Consequences of pollinator population decline
Now that we have characterised the plant evolutionary dynamics, we show how pollinator decline may affect the outcome. We assume that pollinators suffer less favourable environmental conditions (e.g. habitat fragmentation, pesticides, diseases) so that their intrinsic growth rate ( r A ) is decreased. We illustrate the effects of this disturbance through Ecology-Evolution-Environment ( E 3 ) diagrams [33, 34] . These diagrams show the outcome of eco-evolutionary dynamics as function of the environmental parameter. Figure 3 (5), can restore a coexisting system. Yet, a delayed restoration (white arrow (6)), will not allow such a rescue, as evolutionary trajectories diverge from the Garden of Eden singularity eventually leading to the extinction of the pollinator (arrow (7)). (1, 2, 4, 7) give the direction of evolution. Environmental disturbance is represented by a red arrow (3) . White arrows (5, 6) represent restoration attempts at different times along the evolutionary trajectory .Parameters values are s=2.5 , c A =c P =γ P =1 , γ A =0.2 , and α max =0.8 * α cl .
Figure 3: Ecology-evolution-environment ( E 3 ) diagram representing the impact of the environment on the evolution of plant attractiveness and on pollinator (panel a) and plant equilibrium densities (panel b). White areas show parameters for which extinction occurs for either plants or pollinators. . The blue intensity correlates with population densities of pollinators (panel a) or plants (panel b). Black lines show the position of singular strategies; continuous lines show convergent and non-invasible singular strategies (CSS) , and dashed lines show Garden of Edens (non-invasible, divergent). Vertical black arrows

Figure 4: Influence of trade-off shape and mutualistic gains on E 3 diagrams. Columns differ in trade-off concavity. More concave trade-offs allow a larger coexistence domain. Lines of panels differ in the asymmetry of mutualistic gains: in the top line (panels a,b , and c) pollinators benefits more than plants; the middle line (panels d,e, and f) shows equal gains while in the bottom line plant gains are larger. The red points anddotted lines represent the lowest r A and
α α max values for maintaining a CSS, leading to ecological and evolutionary coexistence. Asymmetry in favour of the pollinator or more concave trade-offs allow a larger domain for eco-evolutionary coexistence. Colours and lines are the same as in figure 3 . The parameter values are c A =c P =1 and α m a x =0.8 * α cl .
Finally, we study the impact of trade-off shapes and of the asymmetry between mutualistic gains on the eco-evolutionary outcome ( figure 4) . For strong concave trade-offs, s > 2, (figure 4b, c, e, f, h, i) we observe qualitatively the same dynamics as in figure 3 . For less concave trade-offs, s < 2, only a positive pollinator intrinsic growth rate r A allows coexistence (figure 4a,d,g). In this case, negative pollinator intrinsic growth rates lead to small benefits of the mutualistic interaction for the plant, so that attractiveness is counterselected, eventually leading to the pollinator extinction [35] . For more concave trade-offs (s > 2), we notice that an asymmetric mutualistic gain favouring pollinators allows a larger range, including negative intrinsic growth rates r A , before attractiveness is counterselected and extinction occurs. Therefore, an increased mutualistic gain of the pollinator relative to that of plant facilitates the long term coexistence of the plant-pollinated system. This produces a more robust system that eases a potential restoration process. Note, however, that favouring pollinators gain over plants leads lower selected levels of attractiveness.
Discussion
The present work highlights how evolution may play a critical role for mutualistic interaction maintenance in time. We especially show that evolution may actually be detrimental to this persistence. While we studied a simple two species plant-pollinator system, this allows us to mathematically study the eco-evolutionary dynamics and completely investigate the role of key parameters (e.g. trade-off shapes or mutualistic gains). We showed that only concave trade-offs can lead to stable coexistence in evolutionary times (figure 2). Then we investigated the impact of environmental disturbances simulating the decrease of pollinator intrinsic growth rates (figures 3 and 4). We show that only strong concave trade-offs (s > 2) allow coexistence in degraded environments. Interestingly, the system then exhibits alternative (evolutionary) stable states: a CSS at which the plant and the pollinator coexist, and selection toward ever-decreasing attractiveness, eventually leading to the pollinator extinction (ie, an evolutionary murder of the pollinator by the plant). These two states are separated by a (divergent) Garden-of-Eden evolutionary singular strategy. This is an example of critical transition of a stable and convergent evolutionary strategy, for positive pollinator intrinsic growth rate, to evolutionary bistability for negative pollinator intrinsic growth rate.
Bistability has been highlighted in a variety of ecological situations (e.g. [36] , [37] in mutualistic system), and results from a strong positive ecological feedback loop.
Above a critical value, the system will amplify toward a stable state with higher values, but below, the system will shift to an alternative, degraded, stable state. Here we have a similar phenomenon, but on an eco-evolutionary scale. If plant attractiveness before pollinator deterioration is above the level of the Garden of Eden singular strategy, plant evolution reinforces its attractiveness toward higher values eventually reaching a stable, coexisting system (CSS). On an ecological scale, the interaction reinforcement increases the abundance of both plants and pollinators, which in turn favours the evolution of plant attractiveness toward higher value. Below the critical level, evolution decreases plant attractiveness, which in turn decreases pollinator abundance that feedback into an evolutionary decrease of plant attractiveness. This feedback eventually leads to the evolutionary murder of the pollinator by the plant [35] . Note that the trade-off shape modulates the strength of the positive feedback loop. More concave trade-offs decrease the threshold value above which the positive feedback loop is maintained, thereby facilitating the persistence of the system. On a management side, alternative stable states have large implications, as systems may then shift abruptly, and large restorations are needed to recover previous states [36] . The ecoevolutionary alternative stable states we describe here have similar implications. Our results show that they make restoration attempts more difficult from two different points of view.
First, as highlighted in figure 3 , the timing of the attempt becomes important. Restoration is only successful when achieved before the threshold attractiveness is evolved (see figure 3 ).
Second, just as in ecological hysteresis, if the system becomes degraded, a small restoration attempt will not be sufficient to recover large populations, but large efforts will have to be undertaken.
These results are consistent with the experiment of Gervasi and Schiestl [13] . . A decrease in efficient pollinators indeed leads to less investment in sexual reproduction and attractiveness from the plant side with an increase in selfing (the reproductive assurance hypothesis ). This trend is consistent with other empirical observations (e.g. [41] ). Our results question the efficiency of restoration policies that would solely focus on ecological or environmental restoration. Indeed, here, plant evolution hinder restoration attempts that would have been successful if just ecological dynamics had been considered. Whether evolution indeed weakens or threaten plant-pollinator interactions in the face of external disturbances needs further investigation to properly understand the current pollination crisis (e.g. [42] on plant decline but questioned in [43] ).
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The allocation trade-off
Evolution acts on the plant attractiveness α , that we assume constrained by an allocation trade-off to the plant intrinsic growth rate r P [1] . The plant has a given quantity of energy, divided into different functions: some energy is allocated to intrinsic growth and reproduction, and some to attractiveness [2] .
That is why we model r P as a decreasing function of the attractiveness α :
The plant maximal intrinsic growth rate r P m a x can be fixed to one without loss of generality, by choosing appropriately the time unit. Using (A1) we can express the plant intrinsic growth rate depending on the plant attractiveness:
The s exponent controls the trade-off shape. When s=1 there is a linear relationship between r P and α . When 0< s<1 the trade-off is convex. On the opposite, s >1 will produce a concave trade-off. Examples of the trade-off variations can be found in figure 1. 
Detailed eco-evolutionary dynamics
Detailed analysis of singular strategies
In this part the symbol * signal the ecological equilibrium and ❑ the evolutionary one. The evolving variable α impact the plant intrinsic growth rate r P due to the allocation trade-off (see appendix A) and the plant and pollinator densities at equilibrium (eq 3, main text). The relative fitness function of a mutant plant with attractiveness α m compared to a resident plant with attractiveness α is:
with P m the mutant population density. As explained in the main manuscript, evolutionary endpoints (also called singular strategies) are obtained when trait variation goes to zero. Trait variations are given by the Canonical equation, into which lies the selection gradient (main text, equation (5) . Its sign will give the direction of the trait evolution. Here the selection gradient corresponds to slope of the fitness function (B3) at the resident trait α , given a small variation in the trait ( α m ).
∂ω( α m , α)
Because of the hypothesis of small mutations, this yields: Replacing r P , we obtain:
In the linear case (i.e. when s=1 ), the singular strategy formula is:
This solution is feasible (i.e. positive and in a plausible range value), with α max <α cl as defined in equation (4) of the main text, if and only if 0<c A <α max γ A r A ; i.e. the intraspecific competitive losses need to stay below the maximal energetic gain of the animal.
Conditions for invasibility
With the trade-off function defined in appendix (A1) we can differentiate the fitness function a second time to analyse the convergence and invasibility of the singular strategies, in order to deduce the overall trait dynamics [3] . The singular strategy (α ) is non-invasible (ie, an ESS [4] ) when: Concave trade-offs ( s >1 ) therefore lead to non-invasible singular strategies, while convex trade-offs ( s <1 ) yield invasible strategies.
In the case of a linear trade-off equation B9 is equal to 0, the strategy is neutral from an invasibility point of view.
